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The paper demonstrates that the Self and Peer Assessment (SPA) method 
used in higher education, to map a group work mark to individual marks, can 
easily be modelled as a strategic form game. This modelling predicts students to 
report SPA following their dominant strategies. However, data of a real time SPA 
indicate that students may not report SPA by adopting dominant strategies. The 
findings are indicative of a mismatch between the game (SPA) designed by the 
tutor, and then played by students. The paper concludes that the interpretation of 
SPA is not possible, and statistics of SPA should not be relied upon to map a 
group mark to individual marks. 
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1.  Introduction: 
 
Group work based assessments are frequently used in institutions 
delivering higher education, specifically in Business and Economics disciplines. 
In a group work based assessment, a group of students jointly perform a task, i.e. 
essay, report or presentation. The task is assigned a group mark by an assessor 
(tutor) and is later mapped to individual marks. To facilitate this mapping, many 
assessors explicitly or implicitly depend on a mechanism known as the Self and 
Peer Assessment (SPA)
1
 which essentially is comprised of students’ reports about 
each other’s contribution to the group work.  
The usefulness of SPA has always been a highly debated topic in the 
education literature. This paper identifies that substantial insight about the SPA 
mechanism can be obtained utilising a game theoretic approach. Specifically, SPA 
can easily be modelled as a strategic (or normal) form game where students are 
the players, an individual’s self and peer assessments are the strategies, and each 
combinations of strategies generate utilities through individual marks. However, 
to date no game theoretic paper has attempted to address this practice that impacts 
on the lives of so many students. This paper appears to be the first paper to 
demonstrate this aim. 
The modelling of SPA as a strategic form game allows us to make a 
comparison between the predicted and actual outcomes of an SPA. The paper 
shows, in a generic SPA, the dominant strategy of a student is always to report the 
highest possible self and the lowest possible peer ratings. Therefore the predicted 
Nash equilibrium is characterised by all students reporting the maximum possible 
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self and the lowest possible peer ratings. This prediction is compared with the 
outcomes of a real time SPA. The comparison however reveals a mismatch 
between the predicted and actual outcomes, that is, students instead of playing 
dominant strategies reported each other as equal. This mismatch between 
predicted and actual outcomes indicates the presence of behavioural factors (e.g 
trust, reciprocity, altruism and guilt aversion) which have not been taken into 
consideration by the tutor. We infer that the game designed by the tutor and the 
game played by students differ, therefore the interpretation of the SPA is not 
possible in line with the design perceived by the tutor. This formulation of SPA, 
in this paper, as a strategic form game confirms the issues already known to the 
literature, however it is also indicative of the futility of SPA reliant mapping of 
group marks to individual marks.   
The paper is therefore in opposition to the numerous attempts (see Spater 
et al. 2015 for a recent review) made by the education literature to use self and 
peer assessment to map group marks to individual marks. We argue that these 
mappings are inherently problematic as they are designed without any 
understanding of how marks and utilities of students are interrelated. It is already 
known to the psychologists, economists and educators (Magin 2001, Hanrahan 
and Isaacs 2001, Falchikov 2005, Fehr and Schmidt 2006) that the 
individuals/students not only care about their own satisfaction but also satisfaction 
of their peers. Hence, any mechanism not generated from a proper understanding 
of this interrelationship should not be relied upon, which is exactly the case with 
the utilisation of SPA in mapping the group work marks.  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section demonstrates that a 
generic design of SPA can be easily expressed as a strategic form game, and 
identifies the dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium. In the third section, we 
look at the SPA of a case study and expressed that design as a strategic form 
game. We then identify the Nash equilibrium, dominants strategies and analyse 
the data. Section four discusses the result and section five concludes. 
 
 
2.  SPA as a Strategic Form Game: 
 
 
 SPA asks individuals to rate self and peers according to their contribution 
to the group. The concern of the paper is the game playing between students when 
reporting these ratings. The SPA mechanism depends on the belief that the 




As has been stated previously, a generic SPA can be easily viewed as a 
strategic form game as it contains (1) a set of players (2) strategies for each 
players and (3) utilities for each player for each combination of strategies. We are 
interested to know the characteristics, specifically of the Nash equilibrium of this 
SPA. It will allow us to identify if the Nash equilibrium constitutes truth telling of 
students in that specific design.   
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To elaborate further by developing a generic SPA, let us assume followings:  
 
I. There are n  number of students in a group.  
II. The reported self-assessment of the student i  ( ),....2,1 ni   is  xxii ,0 .  
III. The reported peer-assessment of the student i  about j ( ij  ) is  xxij ,0 .  
IV. The actual self and peer assessments are  xvii ,0  and  xvij ,0 . 
 
 
(II) and (III) implies that the contributions reported are elements of the 
interval from 0 to x .  This interval is predefined by the assessor; for example 
from 0 to 10. Note that the actual SPA and reported SPA are not necessarily the 
same, however, the assessor expects students to set iiii vx  and ijij vx  , that is to 
report truthfully. The design assumes that students are capable of assessing self 
and peer contributions appropriately. 
Therefore, this design is explicit about the two elements of a strategic form 
game i.e. players and strategies. It surely has the third element i.e. the utility 
associated with the combinations of strategies. However, as stated earlier, no such 
assumption regarding the utility can be found in generic SPA designs. 
 To complete our description, let us assume that the utility of a student 
increases when his/her own mark increases and decreases when his/her own mark 
decreases. Additionally, a student is assumed to be indifferent to marks of other 
group members, that is, marks of peers do not affect their level of utility.  
 
 
2.1.  Self-assessment only: 
 
If the assessor only uses self-assessment, truthful reporting i.e. iiii vx   is not a 
dominant strategy when xvii  . To prove it assume : 
 
V. The award scheme is a function i :  Rxii . Assume it is increasing in 
iix . 
 
  (V) implies, as i  is increasing in iix , the dominant strategy of a student is 
to set xxii   as the utility of a student is increasing in his/her own mark. Hence 
truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy when the assessor uses self-
assessment only.   
 
 
2.2.  Combination of self and peer assessment: 
 
 In the case of using of both self and peer assessment, again truthful 
reporting is not a dominant strategy, rather the dominant strategy is to report in a 




VI. An award scheme ig :   RR
n  and i :  Rgi . Assume that ig  is 
increasing in iix  and i  is increasing in ig .  
 
 (VI) implies that the assessor uses the ratings of self and peer assessment 
to create a representative number ig . The representative number is then used to 
award the grade i  to the student i  . It is now obvious the dominant strategy of i  
is to report xxii   for any jix , i.e. the peer assessment by the other members of 
the group.  
 Additionally if ig  is decreasing in ijx , the mark is maximised by the 
lowest possible peer rating. Hence dominant strategy of a student is to report the 
maximum possible self and the lowest possible peer ratings. 
 
2.3.  Peer-assessment only: 
 
 From 2.2 it is now clear that peer-assessment only cannot also be truthful 
when associated to final individual marks. Actually, any association of self/peer 
assessment with the final marks incentivises non-truthful reporting.   
  
2.4. Nash equilibrium: 
 
This section therefore demonstrates that in a generic SPA design, the 
dominant strategy of a student is report the highest possible self and the lowest 
possible peer ratings. These reports are not necessarily truthful. The Nash 
equilibrium of a generic SPA is therefore characterised by all players playing their 
dominant strategies aiming to receive the highest possible mark regardless of 
actual self and peer contributions. 
Note that the assumption on the relationship between mark and utility has 
a significant role in identifying the Nash equilibrium. Without this assumption 
highest possible own mark may not be the aim of a student’s report. This is 
actually the main reason behind of criticising the practice SPA in this paper. If the 
tutor, who designed the SPA, does not know about the relationship between utility 
and mark of a student, then the tutor does not in essence know which game the 
students have played. Therefore, interpretation of rating of SPA is questionable in 




3.  A Case Study: 
 
 
The section evaluates a case study of a real time SPA.  Our aim is to 
demonstrate that the case study resembles the generic design of section 2. We then 
identify the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium and compare that with actual 










The students were asked to deliver a 3000 word group essay. Each group 
consists of 4 members. Students were asked to submit confidential self and peer- 
assessment on each other’s contributions by emailing the tutor. The tutor 
instructed that individual marks will be adjusted upward or downward based on 
SPA, though the actual marking scheme was not made explicit. It was also stated 
that the unit tutor may conduct face to face interviews to ask for justification of 




Self-assessment        Scores 
 
Much more than all other group members:      25 
More than other group members:      20  
Same as other group members:      15  
Less than other group members:      10  
Much less than all other group members:     5  
Peer assessment 
 
X contributed much more than all other group members:   25  
X contributed more than other group members:    20  
X contributed the same as other group members:    15 
X contributed less than other group members:    10  
X contributed much less than all other group members:   5  
 
For marking, the tutor added the SPA received by a student and then 
divided by the group’s total SPA. For example if the SPA of a student is 60 and 
group’s total SPA is 150, the ratio is 0.40 implying that the student did 40% of the 
work and accordingly the mark of the student is adjusted upward. Note that this 
method is similar to the method stated in section 2.2. 
 
 
3.2. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibrium: 
 
 We first establish that this design is similar to the generic design illustrated 
in section 2. This design has 4 players. Each player has a set of strategies. 
Therefore the two elements are explicit in the instructions. However no assertion 
has been made about the relationship between utility and marks. As in the section 
2, let us assume the utility increases with marks and students are indifferent about 
their peers. Hence, this SPA is completely specified as a strategic form game. 
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 In reporting SPA, each student selects self and peer ratings from the set of 
numbers 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25. In a group of 4 students, the number of n-tuples is 
therefore 5
4
=625.  The strategies of students can be denoted by the set 
 62521 ,........,, mmmm sssS  where, 4,3,2,1m  are the members and 625,....,2,1i  
indicate index of the strategies. mis  is a row vector with 4 elements, 
 imimimimmi aaaas 4321 . It implies that each time, a student m picks 4 
numbers, one assigned to self and the others to the group members and a student 
can do it in 625 different ways. The vectors arrange the elements in order by 
indexing the members from 1 to 4. For example, ima 2  implies the rating awarded 
by the student m  to the student indexed as 2 in the i th strategy. In a group of 4, 



























We have avoided writing the upper subscript of elements as they are not 
essential in further analysis and make the matrix clumsy. The diagonal terms of 
the matrix are self-assessments and the off diagonal terms are peer-assessments. 
Each row of the matrix is now the reported ratings by a student. Note also that the 
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This CR increases as the self-rating goes up and falls as the peer rating 
goes up. This  ratio is used by the tutor to adjust the marks upward or downward, 
therefore the dominant strategy of a student is to report the maximum possible self 
(here 25) and the lowest possible peer ratings (here 5) as the utility is 





































































. If students 
play their dominant strategies, the CR of a student is 25% implying that the mark 
of a student is the same as the other group members. Nevertheless, it is the only 
Nash equilibrium of this SPA design, as any deviation from the dominant strategy 
will decrease own marks and consequently utility. The above matrix is the 
benchmark for the subsequent data analysis. Based on identification of the Nash 
equilibrium, we predict to observe a matrix similar to the matrix A. 
 
 
3.3. Analysis of Data: 
 
This section analyses the data of the above SPA. The total number of 
students submitting the SPA was 60. Each group had 4 students with the 
exception of 4 groups, each of which had 3 students. We dropped the groups with 
3 students to ensure uniformity of group size. The analysis therefore uses reports 
of 48 students in 12 groups. 
 
{Insert Figure 1 and 2 here} 
    
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the histograms of self and average peer-assessment. 
Our prediction from the previous analysis implies that the self-assessment will be 
25 and average peer-assessment will be 5. However the majority of the students 
(30 students) have reported 15 as the self-assessment implying that they stated 
their contributions are same as others. Interestingly, a majority of students (33 
students) also reported the peer contribution equal to 15. This implies that 
students rated each other equal which is contradicting with our prediction. 
 
{Insert Table 1 here} 
 
The statistics have been further presented in the Table 1. As can be 
observed, there exists no significant difference in the means of self and average 
peer assessments. The average peer assessment has less spread than the self-
assessment with should be case for an average. Interestingly one student assessed 
self only 5, that is the minimum, however none reported all peer contribution 
equal to 5 as reflected in the minimum of average peer assessment of 11.67.  
 
 
{Insert Figure 3 here} 
 
The final diagram we will look at is Figure 3. The figure shows the 
assessment of self, compared to the assessment of peers by the students. In the 
legend, ‘assessed1Above’ implies that the students have reported only 1 peer 
above self. From the figure, we see that 3 students have done so. Similarly, the 
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figure shows that 6 students have reported 2 peers above self and 2 students have 
reported all 3 peers above self. 37 students have assessed none above self and 22 
students have reported all group members equal. It, therefore, shows that students 
have demonstrated a tendency to assess all equally with a slight tendency to report 
self over the peers. Interestingly, as discussed previously, when the students report 
an equal contribution of all the group members, the outcome yields the same 























The CR of a student is 25.0
240
60
  implying that that the group members 
receive equal marks. However, the predicted and actual structures of the matrices 
differ greatly. In the next section we attempt to shed some lights on possible 
reasons of this difference. 
 
 
4.  Discussion: 
 
We predicted that students will not truthfully report the ratings, and it will 
be done in a manner that will demonstrate the willingness to maximise marks. 
However the matrix above does not demonstrate that predicted pattern. It shows 
that students in general reported all group members’ contributions as equal, hence 
they definitely did not make untrue reports the way we predicted. Does it mean 
that they lied in a different manner or the reports we observed are indeed truthful? 
Our answer to this question will be that we simply do not know and the reasons 
are explained below. 
Our predicted matrix crucially depended on the assumption that utility of 
student increases with own mark and independent of the marks of peers. However, 
a large number of papers through experiments (See Fehr and Schmidt 2006) have 
established that individuals do care about the utility of others. In addition 
behavioural factors such as trust, reciprocity altruism and guilt aversion influence 
human decision. Given the experimental findings, the assumption that students are 
indifferent about marks of peers seems an invalid assumption. 
Note that we made this assumption to facilitate identification of the Nash 
equilibrium of our perceived game. SPA designs in practice would make no 
reference to the relationship between marks and utility.  
Interestingly, the education literature has already identified that 
behavioural factor such as trust, reciprocity, altruism and guilt aversion may 
influence SPA. For example Magin (2001) and Falchikov (2005) mentioned about 
reciprocity bias that arises as a result of friendship and social interaction 
accompanying group task activities. Hanrahan and Isaacs (2001), identified guilt 
aversion as students expressed discomfort in criticising and assessing others’ 
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performance as poor. However, the literature failed to recognise that without a 
proper understanding of the influence of these factors on reports of students, any 
design is deemed to be just an ad-hoc design.  
The actual game structure perceived by the students is simply unknown to 
us. To see it further, note that the instruction set of the case study also resembles 
that of a trust game (Berg et al. 1995, Fehr and Schmidt 2006), where an 
individual would trust another individual to return a monetary sum in the first 
period and the other individual would reciprocate by returning the money in the 
second period. In SPA, a tutor may trust his/her students and expects them to 
reciprocate by reporting the true contribution. However, students may also be 
playing a trust game with each other where the trust is achieved through pre-
communication and friendship. In this regard, SPA can be viewed as a part of a 
large repeated game, where threats and punishments act as enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure equality of reporting. 
All the above is indicative of the existence of a game structure 
significantly more complicated than as it appears at the outset. The problem is the 
lack of understanding of the relationship between marks and utility, and of the 
game structure. Therefore the actual meaning of the reporting of students in 
relation to their contributions is also unknown. As the meanings are unknown, the 
ratings should not be used to map group marks to individual marks. 
The discussion in this section is therefore also indicating that it is not 
possible to develop a reliable method to map group marks to individual marks 
using SPA. A robust design would require a proper understanding of the 
underlying game and unless such an understanding is attained, any attempt to 







SPA is utilised in higher education to map group marks to individual 
marks. The paper demonstrated that the SPA can be modelled as a strategic form 
game. If a student is indifferent about the marks of peers and the utility is 
increasing in own mark, the dominant strategy is to report the maximum possible 
self and the lowest possible peer ratings. However analysis of a case study 
demonstrated that in a real time SPA, students did not play their dominant 
strategies. The result indicated that students are likely to be not indifferent about 
the marks of peers and there exists a different underlying game relative to what 
has been perceived by the tutor. We therefore conclude that in a group work based 
assessment, the meaning of SPA is unknown, and as such SPA should not be used 
to map groups marks to individual marks. 
The analysis of the paper indicated that any attempt to utilise SPA is futile. 
However many (including the author of this paper) maintain the view that group 
work enhances the learning experience and interpersonal communication skill of 
students. This practice of group work therefore needs to be maintained, however 
there needs to be a method to map group marks to individual marks. In this regard 
11 
 
the usefulness of self and peer assessment needs to be further analysed, as it is 
influential in determining the degree classification of students in higher education. 
We anticipate that this paper will attract the attention of other researchers to 
conduct further work on this vital issue, combining game theory and behavioural 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of self and peer assessment scores 
 
Observations Mean  
Standard 
Dev. Minimum  Maximum 
Self 
Assessment 48 15.94 3.67 5 25 
Peer 











Figure 3: Assessment of self compared to the peers 
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